The Madras High Court held in the present case that the parties to an arbitration agreement were free to exclude all other courts from the exercise of jurisdiction if more than one court had jurisdiction to rule on disputes arising from an arbitration agreement. The relevant questions that arose before the Single Bench were, first, whether an appeal could be brought under section 8 of the Arbitration Act without making a claim? Second, in the event of an objection, can the court decide whether the dispute is arbitral or not? Thirdly, cannot claims relating to a single special law be referred to arbitration or, even if there is a right to a legal judgment, the dispute cannot be referred to arbitration proceedings? The Delhi High Court also found that the law to Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Limited et ors, (2011) 5 SCC 532 and Emaar MFG Land Limited (a.a.O.), although certain categories of disputes that are prohibitive are defined, these categories cannot be considered exhaustive and would therefore depend on the facts on a case-by-case basis whether the remedy provided by the Arbitration Act to settle such a dispute is implied or otherwise. The Supreme Court ruled that the contract price had to be paid to the “contractor” for the full and correct performance of its contractual obligations and that clauses 14.7 and 14.11 provided that the tariffs and conditions were to be in effect until the completion or abandonment of the last borehole. The purpose of the call for tenders was to limit the risks of price correction and the Tribunal`s interpretation would completely nullify the explicit formulations and the subject-matter of the contract. Such price fluctuations may not be brought under Article 23 unless a given language indicates the conclusion. Referring to certain other terms of the contract, which indicate that the contractor would provide fuel at its own expense, the Supreme Court found that the Court`s interpretation of Term 23 was perverse. The Supreme Court has held that the essential element of renunciation is that a voluntary and deliberate waiver of a right must take place. Voluntary choice is the essence of renunciation.
There should be a choice between the waiver and the application of the legislation in question. It cannot be admitted that there is no renunciation of precious rights if the circumstances show that what was done was involuntary. The arbitration must be inspired and conducted on the terms agreed by the parties. The arbitrator cannot therefore go beyond the clause of the arbitration agreement. It was found that after four months, the arbitrator was no longer able to perform his duties. The above-mentioned question was therefore decided by the Supreme Court in the present case. Admittedly, the Supreme Court took into account the errors made in the judgment of Tarun Chatterjee J. in minmetals Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Limited. (1999) but C.L.C. 647 found that Hindustan Copper Limited was never in a position to present its case, as it was never under its control to provide legal documents and explanations within the time limit set by the Commission.
Referee. According to the Supreme Court, Hindustan Copper Limited decided not to appear before the arbitrator and then decided to file documents and legal claims outside the time limits granted by the arbitrator. The Delhi Supreme Court ruled that there was no illegal or perverse patent character in the part of the arbitrator`s arbitral award where the arbitrator refused the grant of compound interest and awarded only simple interest, given that the agreement between the parties only provided for interest of 36% per annum and did not provide for compound interest rights. . . .